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THE LAW OF INCOME TAXATION AND
CORPORATE DISTRIBUTIONS*
The law of income taxation, interesting as it may be to
the expert, may be a complex subject even to him, if it is
utilized to the fullest extent. It, as we know, is derived
from all opinion peculiar to taxing income. This opinion,
however, has not been clearly organized into a category,
separate and distinct from other opinion which, though
availed of in administering income taxes, is common to
other branches of law. And it has not been generalized
and reduced to a unified, workable system of rules' such
as that which may be found in a textbook on an older title
of law.
As men of the law profession have learned, the process
of generalization is not always easy, and there are phases
of it which may extend over a long period of time. Indeed,
due to our progress in the law, the work may never be
* The author emphasises that this discussion represents his own per-
sonal views and is not to be interpreted in any sense as the official opinion
of the Treasury Department or any unit thereof.
' In my article Developing a Law of Income Taxation, 32 TAXEs 546
(1954), I have attempted to explain this more fully.
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finished. I feel sure however that in a democracy such as
ours we will continue to strive for perfection, though it
may be beyond our reach. Even in taxation, that spark
within us, which some men call conscience, may not let
us completely ignore our inner urge to distinction in some
fashion.
Simplicity,' despite every device employed against it,
marks a path most conducive to keeping in sight of this
goal in income tax law. This is true because general income
taxation, which is our chief form of taxing income, offers
many opportunities for complexity. This form of taxation
is aimed at income from all sources,3 and has its impact
upon every kind of income-producing activity. It is meas-
ured by the net income which remains after deducting
allowable expenses and other charges, including in some
instances expenditures incurred for purely personal rea-
sons. Hence, due to its scope, it presents a wide variety
of problems, such as, those which arise in determining
what is income, what is deductible, how are taxpayers or
items of their income and deduction to be classified, and
as of what time shall an accounting be made for such items,
no one of which may be adequately solved until all of the
refinements are made once the general standards have
been fixed. Most likely, however, none of these issues will
seriously trouble the administration of a special tax on
2 Simplification has been a subject of considerable discussion from the
outset of federal income taxation, following the adoption of the Six-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution. Congress, by the Revenue Act of
1921, § 1327, 42 STAT. 317, established in the Treasury Department a Tax
Simplification Board which functioned until December 31, 1924. One duty
of the Joint Congressional Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation as
created by the Revenue Act of 1926, § 1203 (c) (4), 44 STAT. 127, was "...
to investigate measures and methods for the simplification of such taxes,
particularly the income tax,"--a duty which has been continued by the
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 5011(b) (1), 53 STAT. 506 (now INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 8022 (2) (a)).
3 Because of constitutional difficulties, a federal income tax can not
reach all income if it is not apportioned among the states to comply with
the restriction on direct taxation; and in the case of any general income
tax, policy may call for exemptions of some kind.
(Vol. XXXI
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income.' This being the case, a general income tax may
bring the law of income taxation into operation in many
ways which are not essential in applying a special tax.
Even so, there appears to be no valid reason for unduly
complicating general income taxing statutes with a mass
of new rules. This is to say, it is not essential that a new
and distinct rule shall be brought into operation at every
step taken in the course of taxing income. In many in-
stances, the general tax rules and the rules of other
branches of law may be availed of in administering the tax.
Ordinarily, this process may be acceptable, except where
distinct rules are for good reason deemed necessary in
classifying taxpayers or their incomes and deductions (as,
for example, to promote uniformity of federal taxation on
a nation-wide basis) or where special rules are otherwise
necessary in dealing with distinctive income tax problems
in a generally satisfactory manner. Once we go beyond the
scope of this exception to put into operation a rule peculiar
to income taxation, it seems that we have to keep on
making income tax law instead of leaning on the past, and
that we can never count on a final prediction respecting
all of its ramifications.*
On the other hand, if we make a reasonable effort to
promote a seemingly simple philosophy, general income
taxation need not be excessively complicated, even if a
new and distinct rule is applied occasionally. It is con-
templated by this philosophy that a rule of this kind shall
for the most part be applied only where the need for it is
generally apparent. In such case, the chief complication,
if it is a complication, is due to the necessity for all persons
concerned to be cognizant of a rule which serves income
4 A special income tax as that term is here used includes inter alia a
tax levied only on dividends received, one on dividends and interest, or a
tax on mining royalties.
5 For a comprehensive discussion of theories of simplification which
we encounter when we depart from the simple approach, see Blum, Sim-
plification of the Federal Income Tax Law, 10 TAx L. Rav. 239 (1954).
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taxation, but not other purposes. However, since the rule
should be directed by reason6 and our general desire for
an ideal system of income tax rules,7 it most likely will
stand out clearly; and its application should be reasonably
predictable by persons moderately experienced in income
taxation, and should be even more easily foretold by the
experts.
When viewed in this manner, the history of federal in-
come taxation reveals one thing, if no other, which we may
say is certain' - that is, in dealing with corporate distribu-
tions, the Act of 1913 was the epitome of statutory sim-
plicity!
In that Act,9 as in the Civil War and also the 1894
income taxing acts,"° the entire matter was covered by a
single word. Logically enough, the word used was divi-
dends. And, important as it is, it appeared in the statute
only as a designation of one of the several items which a
taxable person was required to include in his taxable
income.
Thus, strange as it may seem to us now, the draftsmen
in 1913 evidently believed that this one word in the
6 According to Sir Edward Coke (1551-1634), whose rough temper and
staunch support of constitutional liberties brought him disfavor by King
James and his courtiers: "Reason is the life of the law; nay, the common
law itself is nothing else but reason."
7 "History," says Professor Goble, "reveals a heavy mortality rate
among so-called 'absolute and infallible' principles of law-both moral and
scientific." Goble Nature, Man and Law: The True Natural Law, 41. A.B.A.J.
403, 407 (1955). But history has not put an end to our quest for infallible
law.
8 Of course you may disagree with this, if you agree with Voltaire that
"no general statement is true, not even this one."
9 The Revenue Act of 1913, § II B, 38 STAT. 167, provided that "the net
income of a taxable person shall include gains, profits, and income de-
rived from salaries, wages, or compensation .... or from professions, vo-
cations, businesses, trade, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property
also from interest, rent, dividends. . . !" (Emphasis added).
10 Provisions similar to those in the 1913 Act were contained in the
Revenue Act of 1894, § 27, 28 STAT. 553, which act was declared unconsti-
tutional in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895); in
the Revenue Act of 1864, § 116, 13 STAT. 281; in the Revenue Act of 1862,
§ 90, 12 STAT. 473; and, in the Revenue Act of 1861, § 49, 12 STAT. 309.
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statute accomplished all that was needed in taxing cor-
porate distributions. Hence, no elaboration was made for
the purpose of defining what was meant by the term
"dividends." And there were no special provisions relating
to distributions out of pre-March 1, 1913 surplus, liquidat-
ing distributions, distributions "essentially equivalent to
a dividend," collapsible corporations, preferred stock "bail-
outs," or to any transaction which today causes sufficient
concern to warrant specialized statutory consideration.
In short, the treatment of dividends in the Act of 1913
-was not designed to force into operation a substantial num-
ber of rules of law peculiar to income taxation. This is not
to say that no distinctive tax rules may be needed in taxing
dividends under an act such as that of 1913. A proper
interpretation would have to be made to prevent the taxa-
tion of those distributions which are satisfactorily shown
to be out of capital receipts. And distinct rules of some
kind might be necessary to conform the administration of
the tax to our standards of justice.
Nevertheless, if current tax experts are to judge our
efforts in 1913, perhaps they will think we were then too
naive in believing that the application of a general income
tax to corporate distributions may be so simple.' But, the
most likely result, despite all of the statutory ramifications
enacted later, is that the time may come, if it has not been
with us from the outset, when little difficulty should be
encountered in applying the tax to these distributions.
Indeed, when you come to think of it, except perhaps
for some vestige of the stock dividend controversy, it may
be clear that American stockholders are on the whole de-
cidedly unmoved by the questions which supposedly
11 This was not unusual at that time, for the entire concept of taxing
income was then simpler than it is today. Indeed, beginning with its origin
in antiquity, in Sumeria and in ancient Egypt, which was milleniums prior
to federal income taxation, the income tax was truly a simple tax. It, how-
,ever, took on complexities when the general income tax was inaugurated
in England in 1798, but not as many as we now have. H. C. ADAis, TBE
:SciENcE OF FNANcE 477 (1899); SELICMAN, TnE INcoME TAx 57 (1914).
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trouble them, and certainly puzzle the experts. Where
there is concern, we may find that it is in the main aimed
at those distributions which are so planned by closely held
corporations that they are more akin to tax saving devices
than to pure dividend policy or stern business decisions.
Be that as it may, the assumption in 1913 must have
been that corporation law respecting corporate distribu-
tions generally would be availed of for the purpose of
applying the tax. In brief, the 1913 Act anticipated no
additional complication such as that derived from applying
new and distinct rules of law in determining whether,
without regard to corporation law, a distribution consti-
tutes ordinary dividend income within the meaning of
the taxing act. If the distribution constituted a dividend
properly paid according to corporation law in that it was
not an unlawful impairment of capital, 2 it was considered
to be dividend income. Moreover, there was not then, and
does not appear at any other time to have been, any wide-
spread practice by stockholders or income tax officials to
question the legality of dividends paid. Thus, where stock
was redeemed or liquidated, if the distribution exceeded
the capital paid-in in respect of the part of the stock re-
deemed or liquidated, only the excess was classed as
an ordinary dividend-and each other distribution was in
substance and effect presumed to be a dividend properly
declared and paid, subject of course to an adjustment of
some kind in the occasional case where the distribution was.
repaid because it had been illegally made. In short, the
ordinary, common concept of dividend income was em-
ployed for the purposes of the tax.
This simple approach in the 1913 Act served to synchro-
nize income taxation of corporate distributions with
business views and corporation law. By the law which safe-
12 Not all distributions out of capital receipts are unlawful. For example..
under the wasting asset doctrine, a corporation owning a natural resource
may distribute dividends out of its depletion reserve.
[Vol. X=X
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guards creditors of a corporation, they are entitled to
rely upon corporate capital to assure payment of their
claims; and distributions may not lawfully be made to
stockholders out of capital receipts in violation of credi-
tors' rights.'3 The capital of a corporation may be legiti-
mately dissipated by losses due to businesslike opera-
tions,"4 but our system of law does not permit corporate
capital to be impaired to the detriment of the creditors
by distributions to stockholders.' Though the volume of
literature on the subject of taxing liquidating distributions
perhaps is ample to warrant a naive impression that dis-
tributions of this kind are rather common business trans-
actions, the liquidation of a corporate business seldom is
planned for business purposes. Unfortunately, it occurs
more frequently in case of extreme financial difficulty in
meeting the demands of creditors. In other words, even
liquidations may be unlawful, if they improperly jeopar-
dize the interests of the creditors. 6 On the other hand,
stock dividends, which are somewhat common and have
caused considerable tax controversy, do not impair the
capital of a corporation, for a dividend of this character
may be out of surplus created by the questionable device of
revaluing capital assets and hence does not effect the
earnings or profits, or it may capitalize earnings and
profits and thus prevent them from being available for
13 Business accounting, where properly applied to corporations, is geared
to corporation law so that the amount safely considered to be available for
dividend distribution without impairing capital may be readily ascertained.
Cf. 2 KEsTER, AccouNTING THEORY AND PRACTICE 428 (1921); FINNEY, PIN-
cn'LEs or AccoUNTING 10-13 (1928).
14 But it may be that subsequent earnings must be applied to restore
capital if the value of the assets is not equal to the amount of capital.
'5 Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Tennessee, 153 U.S. 486 (1894); Warren v. King,
108 U.S. 389 (1883).
16 In some cases, a liquidation may not jeopardize the interests of un-
paid creditors if eit~er before or in the course of the liquidation the stock-
holders guarantee payment of the corporate liabilities in a manner which
fully protects the creditors. But these steps generally may be taken only
by a closely held corporation.
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distribution to stockholders as ordinary dividends.'
Thus, if the directors of a corporation never act unlaw-
fully, every distribution made to stockholders is legal;
and, when received by them, it constitutes dividend in-
come within the general conception of that term, ex-
cepting, however, that part which is properly paid out of
capital receipts. In administering an income tax, we how-
ever should not lightly presume that a distribution is
illegally made. It is appropriate, and simpler, to presume
that every distribution to a stockholder is lawfully made
and represents dividend income for income tax purposes
except to the extent that it is made out of capital receipts,
leaving to the stockholder the opportunity to deny the
legality of the distributions, if he boldly believes that he
has no right to it.
Under a scheme of this kind, it is unnecessary for a tax
official or a stockholder or the corporation in which he
holds stock, to assume an extensive burden of tracing the
source of corporate distributions to ascertain whether they
are out of "earnings or profits" within the meaning as-
signed to the term by corporation law or as specially de-
fined for income tax purposes. Or to put it this way, the
burden which later developed in this connection" was
not anticipated when the Act of 1913 was drafted. Sim-
7 Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549 (1890). See also note 88 infra.
Is All taxing acts subsequent to the Act of 1913 in effect place this duty
upon the administrative official, as well as upon the stockholder, in that
dividends include distributions out of earnings or profits earned since March
1, 1913. With the exception that in the case of the 1936 Act and subsequent
enactments, they also include distributions which are not in excess of cur-
rent earnings or profits. See Revenue Act of 1916, § 2 (a), 10, 39 STAT. 757,
765; Revenue Act of 1916, § 31 (which was added by the Revenue Act of
1917, § 1211, 40 STAT. 337); Revenue Act of 1918, § 201, 40 STAT. 1059; Reve-
nue Act of 1921, § 201, 42 STAT. 228; Revenue Act of 1924, § 201, 43 STAT.
254; Revenue Act of 1926, § 201, 44 STAT. 10; Revenue Act of 1928, § 115, 45
STAT. 822; Revenue Act of 1932, § 115, 47 STAT. 203. In the case of the acts
after 1936, they also include distributions which are not in excess of cur-
rent earnings or profits. Revenue Act of 1936, § 115, 49 STAT. 1687; Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 115(a), 53 STAT. 46; Irr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 312(g) (1)
§ 316(a) (2), and § 363, 68 A STAT. 95.
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plicity was inherent in the opinion of that time, as is evi-
denced by the fact that the theory adopted had long been
employed in administering the English taxing act. 9
But the situation soon changed. Beginning with the Act
of 191620 and continuing down to the present time, we
have from time to time inflated the statutory provisions
respecting the taxation of corporate distributions until
today they constitute more than twenty-five sections"' in
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,22 all in contrast to
one meaningful word of common usage in the Act of
1913.23
Now this feature of the 1954 Code, which some critics
allege to be a frustrating one, is not an imperfection in
the law of income taxation. It reflects a development which
has been under way for many years. This is to say, if
the new Code contains complexities, and I do not maintain
19 KONSTA a, INcoME TAX § 327 (12th ed. 1952), and the cases cited there-
in. Canada employs a simple method, similar to that in our Act of 1913, in the
treatment of ordinary dividends. Canadian Income Taxing Act, § 6 (a), CCH
CAN. TAX REP. 10-425. But see section 81 of the Canadian Act respecting
stock dividends, undistributed corporate income and liquidating dividends.
CCH CAN. TAX REP. 14-775. See also note 29 infra, respecting the rule ap-
plied under the Wisconsin income taxing acts of 1911 and 1913.
20 See the definition of dividends in the Revenue Act of 1916, § 2(a)
and 10, 39 STAT. 757 and 765.
21 See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301-395 (Subchapter C).
22 A full explanation of the technical provisions in the LbT. REV. CODE OF
1954, §§ 301-395 (Subchapter C), appeared in prior issues of the Notre
Dame Lawyer, in three installments: Peterson, Corporate Distributions and
Adjustments-Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, L Cor-
porate Distributions, 30 NOTRE DAME LAW. 191 (1955); II. Corporate Liqui-
dations, 30 NOTRE DArm LAW. 360 (1955); III. Corporate Organizations and
Reorganizations, 30 NOTRE DAM LAW. 617 (1955). For an excellent, concise
summary of these statutory provisions see the Jonr Comm. ON INT. REv.
TAXATION, U.S. DEV'T OF TEAsIuY, SrIumABY oF THE Nsxv PROVISIONS OF THE
INTERNAL REvExuE CODE OF 1954 29 (1955).
23 Indeed, our system of tracing the source of corporate distributions
and its method of classifying and taxing distributions is more elaborate and
in some respects more artificial than that employed in any other country.
Generally speaking, the British philosophy, see note 17 supra, prevails in
India where income tax legislation is as old as 1860; in Canada, see note 19
supra, and in Australia. For statutes typical of the continental approach, see
the translations in JoINT CoMni. ON INT. REv. TAXATION, U.S. DEP'T OF TEAs-




that it typifies simplicity at its best, it is the result of
complex thinking over a long period of time.2"
The thoughts which culminated in the extensive pro-
visions in the 1954 Code therefore pose the question
whether income tax simplification may be achieved un-
less we first generally accept a simple philosophy which
may be implemented by clear, concise rules. Even then, it
perhaps may obtain only if the justness of the tax does
not require complications of some sort. On the other
hand, this I know-it certainly is difficult for us to reduce
a confusion of theories to a plain statement of rules which
may be easily understood and explained. And the task is
even more difficult where there is substantial disagree-
ment on the manner in which conflicting intricate theories
are to be applied.'
Out of necessity then, the provisions in the 1954 Code
respecting corporate distributions had to be extensive, if
they were to reflect the current mixture of opinion. If they
are not satisfactory-if they are too complicated-the
fault lies in the opinion and conflicting views from which
they spring. This is to say, the complexity of the 1954 Code
is no new or novel circumstance. It is derived from com-
plicated theories which we have developed during the past
four decades.
For these reasons, the complexity as dramatically
formalized in the 1954 Code is no ground for criticising
legislative efforts. On the contrary, it is just cause for us
to make a general review of our own thinking. Such re-
view, if it achieves its objective, should disclose any di-
vergence which may be found between the law of income
24 This reminds me of what James Russell Lowell once said: "All free
governments, whatever their name, are in reality governments by public
opinion; and it is on the quality of this public opinion that their prosperity
depends."
25 For example, the complexities allegedly existing in the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954 pertain for the most part to matters as to which we long
have been in disagreement and perhaps even now have not reached any
general agreement as to how they should be treated.
[Vol. XXXI
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taxation and other branches of law pertaining to these
distributions, to the end that we may generally agree
upon the extent to which a divergence of this kind properly
should be applied in the practical administration of the
tax. In this discussion, I however do not propose to ex-
amine the merits of any policy matter as to how a given
distribution should be taxed. No matter what the policy
decision may be, chances are that corporate distributions
which are within the universal concept of dividend in-
come will with some exception be taxed as dividend
income. My sole purpose is to try to show that, whatever
the exceptions may be, the basic structure of the statute
may be simple, with the exceptions added to it, instead
of burdening every-one concerned with a complex basic
structure on which must be superimposed the even more
involved provisions which are necessary to prevent un-
due hardship on the one hand and undesired tax avoidance
on the other.
In considering the problem from this angle, the year
1916 is important. In that year the door was opened, per-
haps quite by accident, for the beginning of a wide de-
parture from the theory behind the treatment of corporate
distributions in the 1913 Act. This was accomplished by
defining the word "dividends," the original objective in
doing this being to provide statutory certainty that stock
dividends26 were taxed. But in the course of enacting
26 The Act of 1913 did not mention stock dividends and later was held
not to include them. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918). In ordinary
language, a stock dividend perhaps is not a dividend. But it may be an
advantage or gain which may be taxed. Swan Brewery Co. v. The King,
[19141 A.C. 231, so holding with respect to a special Dividends Duties Act
of Western Australia. For cases in which- a different view is taken in re-
spect of a general income tax, see Comm'rs of Inland Revenue v. Blott,
[1921) 2 A.C. 171; and two Indian cases: Steele Brothers & Co. v. Govern-
ment, 1 REP. INxcom TAx CASES 326 (High Ct. of Judicature at Rangoon,
India 1924); Conm'r of Income Tax v. Binney & Co.,. 1 REP. INcozm TAX
CASES 358 (High Ct. of Judicature at Madras, India 1921). And under a
federal income taxing act, there is the further question--whether the stock
dividend is income within the Sixteenth Amendment so that a tax thereon




the legislation, Congress also granted tax-exemption to
dividends paid out of surplus accumulated prior to March
1, 1913, the date on which the 1913 Act went into effect.
To achieve this latter objective, and apparently as sheer
technique in draftsmanship, the phrase "earnings or
profits" was used in the definition. Thus, in the bill as
enacted, the term "dividends" was defined to mean "any
distribution made or ordered to be made by a corporation,
.. out of its earnings or profits accrued since" (emphasis
added) March 1, 1913, whether paid "in cash or in stock
of the corporation."27
In other words, instead of this provision being limited
in a simple way to its proposed scope, it in substance and
effect set up a distinct income tax standard for determin-
ing the extent to which any distribution made was to be
regarded as dividend income under the taxing act. It did
this by introducing an earnings or profits test for tracing
the source of all corporate distributions. As demonstrated
by subsequent history, this step smoothed the way for
taxpayers as well as tax officials and the courts to develop
the art of defining solely for tax purposes what is meant
by the elusive term "earnings or profits." And, what is
even more significant, it did not preclude them from
employing the term in a manner which need not conform
to the business concept as derived from corporation law.'
The distinct tax opinion and concepts brought forth by
this approach appear to be geared to a view that the ac-
cumulated earnings and profits of a corporation at any
27 See the Revenue Act of 1916, § 2 (a), 39 STAT. 757, relating to individu-
al stockholders, and § 10 of that Act, 39 STAT. 765, relating to corporate
stockholders. One difficulty with the provision, which need not be dis-
cussed here in detail, was that it gave to the distributing corporation the
power to designate the distribution as one made out of pre-March 1, 1913
surplus merely by stating in the corporate resolution that the dividend
was so made.
28 I doubt that this aspect was anticipated when the 1916 Act was en-
acted. More likely, as I shall show, the legislative draftsmen presumed that
earnings and profits would be determined in accordance with the legal and
business accounting principles applied in corporation law.
(Vol. XXX
THE LAW OF INCOME TAXATION
given time are susceptible of precise ascertainment. On
the other hand, in business and in corporation law, it is
generally recognized, and, if we are to be realistic in the
matter, it must be recognized, that the allocation of earn-
ings and profits to fixed accounting periods is a process
of estimation. There are many instances where the amount
to be allocated to a given period depends entirely upon
the application of what appears to be the most reasonable
method of making the allocation. For this reason, the
tax computation as well as the application of law for the
protection of corporate creditors may be more than a
skillful mechanical operation in computing earnings and
profits with slide-rule accuracy.
For tax purposes, it therefore may be simpler, if not
wiser, to consider the facts as we find them. Thus, in
cases where the rights of creditors are properly respected
-indeed where the creditors do not question the legality
of a distribution-it may be simpler to proceed .on the
basis that there is no particular reason in income taxation
29 While determining the status of corporate dividends the court in Van
Dyke v. Milwaukee, 159 Wis. 460, 146 N.W. 812 (1917), at 814 said that:
"Ordinary dividends declared by going corporations, including
mining corporations, are and always have, in the common accepta-
tion of the term, been regarded as income, spoken of and under-
stood to be such by people generally ... The task of tracing divi-
dends declared by all sorts of corporations to their source to de-
termine how much came from capital, and how much from income,
strictly speaking, or how much from an enhancement of capital
value, would be colossal in the amount of labor required, perplexing
in character, and productive of almost endless litigation."
To the same effect, State ex rel. Pfister v. Widule, 166 Wis. 48, 163 N.W.
641 (1917), under the Wisconsin income tax law of 1911. As to the English
and Canadian rules, see note 19 supra. As late as 1925 similar simplicity
was being urged in respect of our federal income tax:
"As a general rule, a corporation and its shareholders are different
persons .... In that view of the relationship of corporation and
shareholder, it should make no difference from what source any
particular corporate dividend is derived. It is a return of capital
or it is not, and so far as the limitations of the constitution are
concerned, every distribution by a corporation not a return of
capital contributed may be taxed as a dividend.... Its incidence
as a yield to the corporation, and the circumstances which produced
it make no difference." (Emphasis added). G. E. IloLiuss, FEDERAL
INcounm TAx 789 (6th ed. 1925).
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to trace the source of each distribution in order to de-
termine whether it represents dividend income within the
meaning of a concept devised only for tax purposes.'
Notwithstanding all of this, the 1916 Act initiated a
different course of tax considerations. In short, it then be-
came imperative that we abandon utmost simplicity in
classifying corporate distributions for tax purposes.
Even the simplest classification feasible for tax purposes
divides these distributions into two categories-(1) those
which are unchallengedly paid as dividends and (2) those
which are made out of capital receipts upon liquidation
of all or part of the corporate business or, if otherwise
made, are returned to the corporation because they were
illegally paid. The Act of 1916 rejected this scheme of
classification, and created further categories. In doing so,
it added a complexity of the sort which may be expected
to be inherent in the administration of any practice which
does not conform to the common concept of dividends.
The philosophy behind such action hence is fundamental
to most of the ramifications in our current scheme of
classifying corporate distributions for general income tax
purposes. Because of it, we today determine whether some
dividends though not out of capital receipts shall be
applied against the shareholder's cost or basis of his stock
and either not taxed or, if any part is to be taxed, that it
may be treated as capital gain taxable at a special lower
rate. Conversely, there is the possibility that some distribu-
tions which are actually out of capital receipts may be
treated as dividend income.30
This much however may be said in justification of the
30 In mentioning the effect of this method of classification, I do not mean
that a reasonable estimation of earnings or profits has no proper place in
corporation law or in business. On the contrary, I agree that it is sound
business practice to pay dividends only when they may be paid out of earn-
ings and profits as estimated in accordance with generally accepted busi-
ness accounting principles, noting, however, that a conservative practice
in this respect is not required in mining industries where the chief corpo-
rate asset is a wasting one.
[Vol. XXXI
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1916 Act. From one point of view, its inclusion of the
earnings or profits test might have been construed as
though it went no further than to recognize the concepts
generally applied in corporation law and sound business
practice. Perhaps, even under that statute, it was proper
to presume that all corporate distributions were out of
earnings or profits in the absence of satisfactory evidence
of the extent to which they were from capital receipts.
However, even if this explanation of the 1916 statute
should have been accepted as the correct one, it did not
prevail, which is all the more reason for saying that we
did not then anticipate the extent of the tax complications
incident to the distinct tax concept of earnings or profits
which was triggered by that statute.?'
One reason for our naiveness in that respect is that
income tax accounting did not unfold according to the
pattern then provided. In the 1916 Act, provision was
first made by federal statute for synchronizing income
tax accounting with sound business accounting;32 and it
therefore was proper then to assume that earnings and
profits as calculated in accordance with generally rec-
31 The development hence began before the Supreme Court held that
corporate distributions out of pre-March 1, 1913 surplus were taxable un--
der the 1913 Act, in Lynch v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339 (1918). Cf. Lynch v.
Turrish, 247 U.S. 221 (1918); and Gulf Oil Corp. v. Lewellyn, 248 U.S. 71
(1918). This fact appears to contradict the view that these and other de-
cisions in 1918 led Congress to establish the test respecting the source in
the corporation, i.e., the earnings or profits test of taxability. Cf. Paul,
Ascertainment of "Earnings or Profits" for the Purpose of Determining
Taxability of Corporate Distributions, 51 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1937).
32 The Revenue Act of 1916, 39 STAT. 756, § 8 (g) at 763, and § 13 (d) at
771, inaugurated a system of income tax accounting applicable to individu-
als and corporations, whereby a corporation keeping books upon any ba-
sis other than that of actual receipts and disbursements is permitted, sub-
ject to regulations, to "make its return upon the basis upon which its ac-
counts are kept . . .", unless such basis does not clearly reflect its income.
Provision for this system has been included in all subsequent federal in-
come taxing acts. Cf. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 41-44, 53 STAT. 24. But the
INT. REv. CODE or 1954, §§ 446, 451-454, 461, 462 amplified these provisions
considerably. However, sections 452 and 462 were repealed retroactively for
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1953 and ending after August
16, 1954, by Pub. L. No. 74, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 5, 1955), 11 U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEws 2211 (1955).
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ognized and accepted business accounting principles would
be used for tax purposes in considering whether a given
corporate distribution constituted dividend income to the
stockholders. To date this idealistic objective has not been
attained,33 because even now there are conflicting views
as to what income tax accounting methods are permissible.
In fact, our views on tax accounting methods may alone
cause some theoretical, and an occasional actual, incon-
gruity in taxing corporate distributions.
For one thing, there are instances where a corporation
may not pay a valid dividend, yet, if its earnings and
profits available for dividend distributions are determined
by the corporation's tax accounting method, the corpora-
tion may be treated as though it could properly make a
lawful dividend distribution. For example, suppose a
given corporation has a sizeable sum of cash receipts,
commonly referred to as deferred income because the
receipts have not been earned. Let us also suppose that
without taking this deferred income into account, the
corporation has no surplus out of which to pay dividends.
This being the case, it is unlikely under ordinary cir-
cumstances that the corporation would declare a dividend.
If it did, and if there are no other circumstances to show
that the capital of the corporation was not impaired by
such action, the dividend should be considered to be an
illegal one,3" in case a creditor properly objected to pay-
33 As to the use of generally recognized and accepted business account-
ing methods for tax purposes, see my discussion of the problem before the
University of Chicago Federal Tax Conferences in Reiling, Practical Legal
Aspects of Tax Accounting, 30 TAXES 1028 (1952); Tax Accounting for Re-
pricing and Other Reserves, 31 TAXEs 990 (1953). Cf. Pacific Grape Prod-
ucts Co. v. Commissioner, 219 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1955). See also Reiling,
Tax Accounting and Abnormal Income, 30 TAXES 409 (1952).
34 Of course, I realize that to secure uniformity in income taxation on
a nationwide basis not every statutory prohibition against paying divi-
dends has tax significance. The main one involves the question whether a
distribution is out of capital receipts. Other restrictions are aimed at pro-
hibiting dividends even though as a matter of law they otherwise are per-
missible. Distributions made in violation of such restrictions or contrary
to contractural arrangements or provisions in the corporate by-laws may
nevertheless constitute dividend income to the stockholders.
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ment of the dividend on the ground that his rights were
being violated.
Nevertheless, in the example given, if the deferred in-
come is treated as taxable income to the corporation, which
is possible under some views with respect to income tax
accounting methods, 5 the distribution may be regarded
as having been paid out of earnings or profits within the
meaning of that term as used in the taxing statute, though
for corporate purposes it may be deemed to have been
paid out of capital receipts. And it may be taxed as
dividend income to the stockholders receiving it, though
as a matter of corporation law it impairs the corporate
capital.
If in such case the stockholders later are required to
repay the amount of the distribution to the corporation,
there is a further tax complication, for this action poses
the question whether the repayment is to be related back
to the year in which the distribution was received, there-
by entitling the stockholder to an adjustment of the tax
paid on it, providing the adjustment is not barred by a
time limitation. On the other hand, the stockholder's
remedy may be to take a tax deduction for the year in
which the repayment is made.36 In either event, the ulti-
35 As to whether deferred income is taxable when received, see G.C.M.
20021, 1938-1 Cum. BuLL. 157, and compare it with the citations in note 39
supra, and with . T. 3369, 1940-1 Cum. BULL. 46, and the decision in Beacon
Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955), wherein a
taxpayer apparently was allowed to change its method of accounting with-
out applying for or receiving the consent of the commissioner.
36 For decisions adopting this latter rule, see: United States v. Lesoine,
203 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1953); St. Regis Paper Co. v. Higgins, 157 F.2d 884
(2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 843 (1947); Charles G. Duffy, 2 T.C.
568 (1943). Contra, T. B. M. 77, 1 Cum. BuLL. 25 (1919). This administrative
application was made prior to the Supreme Court decision in North Ameri-
can Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932), in which the so-called "claim
of right" doctrine was laid down by the Court. But under this prior view,
as set out in the appeal of Charles G. Duffy, supra, the stockholder must
be under a legal obligation to repay in order for repayment to relieve him
of tax liability. It, therefore, is consistently held that voluntary repayment
does not relieve the stockholder of liability for tax on the dividend. J. A.
Swanson, 2 B.T.A. 1112 (1925); SOL. OP. 110, 4 Cusm. BuLL. 73 (1921);
T. B. R. 42, 1 Cmu. BuLL. 65 (1919). It is similar where the corporation
rescinds a dividend because it discovers that it has been said not to be
subject to a personal holding company tax. Crellin's Estate v. Commissioner,
203 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1953).
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mate tax result is one which may be reached by the stock-
holder personally applying the ordinary concept of divi-
dend income, there being no good reason for making him
or the corporate directors believe that the result depends
upon the corporation accounting for its earnings or profits
pursuant to a distinct tax rule.
Then too, there are other instances where the situation
is reversed in that there are no earnings or profits as
computed for tax purposes, even though a distribution may
be made without impairing the capital of the corporation.
For example, suppose a corporation with a long-term
contract files its returns and reports its income from the
contract according to the completed contract method. 7
Also, suppose that the corporation has completed 80
per cent of the contract and has actually received 72 per
cent of the contract price. If its tax accounting method is
used in computing its earnings or profits,3" the corporation
has no earnings or profits available for dividend distribu-
tion, since the contract has not been completed and the
time for a tax accounting of the profits earned has not
arrived. Yet, if a dividend not in excess of the profits
earned is paid, I have difficulty believing that under
corporate law the payment would be regarded as illegally
made out of capital receipts, unless there is some strange
remedy available to the creditors which I have over-
37 This method is described in the U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39-42-4 (1953),
and in the corresponding sections or articles of prior regulations beginning
with the U. S. Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 36 (1918).
38 See the U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.115 (a) -2 (1953), which states that
"the amount of the earnings or profits in any case will be dependent upon
the method of accounting properly employed in computing net income . . ."
which of course is a sound application of the statute, since it contemplates
the use of a tax concept in determining earnings or profits as distinguished
from a corporation law test as to whether there has been an impairment
of capital which jeopardizes the rights of creditors and renders the divi-
dend illegal. Thus, a corporation computing income on the installment ba-
sis is required to compute earnings and profits on such basis. Commissioner
v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948). But, showing the difficulty
in settling the law in this respect, it was previously held to the contrary.
Commissioner v. Shenandoah Co., 138 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1943).
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looked. 9
This suggests the possibility that a charge of impairment
of capital may be sustained by the creditors, or, on the
other hand, may be adequately answered on behalf of
the corporation or its directors, by a showing of all of the
pertinent facts, no matter what accounting method is
followed by a corporation in keeping its books." Develop-
ment of standards for going behind the books, even if
it may be accomplished outside the law of income taxa-
tion, of course is no easy matter; and the presence of this
difficulty most likely contributed its fair share in prompt-
ing the adoption of an artificial standard for tax purposes,
which of course is one solution of the problem if the taxa-
tion of corporate distributions must be wedded to an
earnings or profits test of some kind.
Even so, whatever justification there may be in income
taxation for tracing the source of each distribution, it
seems considerably unrealistic to classify corporate dis-
tributions by reference to earnings and profits as com-
puted in accordance with its tax accounting method. By
such classification, distributions by one corporation may
be regarded as dividend income while those by another
corporation with a different tax accounting system may
not constitute dividend income. Thus, for the purpose of
fixing stockholder tax liability, decisive significance at-
taches to differences in the manner in which corporations
keep their books and make their reports for tax purposes.
This, as I view it, is a feature which has little or no bear-
ing upon a stockholder's ability to pay or upon his right
to the same tax treatment afforded stockholders of other
39 Compare: Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit Inc., 21 F.2d 720 (8th Cir.
1927); Vogtman v. Merchants' Mortgage & Credit Co., 20 Del. Ch. 364, 178
Ati. 99 (1935); Splittgerber Bros. v. Skinner Packing Co., 119 Neb. 259, 228
N.W. 531 (1930); Irving Trust Co. v. Gunder, 152 Misc. 83, 271 N. Y. Supp.
795 (1934).
40 It is generally recognized that bookkeeping entries do not necessarily
reflect a corporation's earnings and profits. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.115
(a) -2 (1953); Charles G. Duffy, 2 T.C. 568 (1943).
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corporations under analogous circumstances.
In applying a distinct tax concept of corporate earnings
or profits, the process of complication extends to matters
such as the date as of which the tax determination shall
be made in considering whether there are earnings or
profits available for dividend distribution. For some time
the prevailing tax rule has been that the date of payment,
not of declaration, is the controlling date.41 The rule,
though dealing with a matter of only occasional impor-
tance, however was not developed without considerable
conflict of opinion and controversy.12 And it does not
appear to reflect too much reality, though it may be said
to be a proper interpretation of the word "distribution"
as used in the taxing act.43
The effect however is that we do not accept the facts
as determined by corporation law. According to corpora-
tion law, the declaration of a dividend creates the re-
lationship of debtor and creditor between the corporation
and its stockholders; and the holders of the stock, with
41 In the U. S. Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 1541 (1918), it was said: "The mere
declaration of a dividend is not a distribution." In Mason v. Routzahn, 275
U.S. 175 (1927), though it did not directly involve the point here discussed,
the Court said at 178 that: "We think it clear that . . . the date of pay-
ment, not the date of the declaration of the dividend, is the date of distri-
bution. . . ." But the decision has been followed in a number of cases such
as Beneficial Corp. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 396 (1952), aff'd per curiam,
202 F.2d 150 (1953); Hind v. Clarke, 34 F.2d 583 (N.D.N.Y. 1929), aff'd per
curiam, 39 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir. 1930); Dodge v. United States, 64 Ct. Cl. 178
(1927); Moody v. Commissioner, 9 B.T.A. 631 (1927); and the rule has been
applied, regardless of whether the taxpayer was on the cash or the accrual
basis, Tar Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 130 F.2d 866 (3d Cir. 1942);
Commissioner v. American Light & Traction Co., 156 F.2d 398 (7th Cir.
1946). But if the individual accounts of the stockholders are credited with
their pro rata shares of the dividend declared such action may constitute
a distribution. Roe v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1951); Commis-
sioner v. Goldwyn, 175 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1949), affirming, 9 T.C. 510 (1947).
42 Prior to the Mason case, note 41 supra, the date of declaration was
considered decisive in several cases.
43 See the language of the Supreme Court in note 41 supra. No matter
what date is employed, the tax test of earnings or profits puts a burden
upon the stockholder who, except in the case of a closely held corporation,
may be in no position to review the financial history of the corporation
to ascertain whetber a given distribution is out of earnings or profits.
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respect to which a dividend has been declared, are on a
par with other creditors of the corporation. This is to say,
it is the declaration of a dividend which in law separates
the earnings from the balance of the corporate property
and appropriates them to the stockholders; and the fact
that the dividend is payable at a future date is immaterial
in determining when the appropriation is made.44
Thus, according to the present tax treatment, which,
.as I have shown, had its basic origin in the Act of 1916, a
dividend which is illegal in that it was declared out of
-capital receipts may be regarded as dividend income, if
subsequent to the declaration and at the time of the pay-
ment of the dividend the corporation has earnings or
profits which, when taken into account pursuant to its
method of tax accounting, are equal to the dividend. But,
despite the mental gymnastics to reach this conclusion, the
-dividend, being illegal, should be repaid and chances are
this will be done if any creditor is injured. If it is repaid,
there will be a tax adjustment. If it is not, then the
illegality is more theoretical than real, and the end result
-could have been accomplished in a simple fashion under
the pattern of the 1913 Act, without a special tax test of
earnings and profits. On the other hand, if we apply
the tax test, a dividend which is legal under corporation
law may not be considered to be dividend income for tax
purposes, if prior to payment the corporation suffers losses
which wipe out the corporate earnings and profits as
-computed for income tax purposes.45
As a practical matter, this divergence between the tax
,concept and corporation law may in some instances be
44 United States v. Guinzburg, 278 Fed. 363 (2d Cir. 1921). Moreover,
.after a dividend has been declared, it may be that the fund thereby ap-
propriated to the stockholders is not taxable as property of the corporation.
Cf. Pollard v. First Natl Bank, 47 Kan. 406, 28 Pac. 202 (1891). However,
it does not follow that a stockholder on an accrual basis may not be re-
quired, as a matter of administrative convenience, to account for the divi-




somewhat minimized by a change in the tax definition of
dividends which was made in the Act of 193646 to treat
as dividend income distributions which are not in excess
of the earnings or profits of the year in which the distribu-
tion is made. By reason of this change in the statute,47 the
tax treatment may conform to the common concept of
dividends, but not necessarily to corporation law in all
States, where, except for the change, the distribution could
not be treated as ordinary dividend income for tax pur-
poses.
The next principal step along the hard road to a tax
concept of earnings or profits available for ordinary divi-
dends is to determine what items enter into the computa-
tion. On this point, the position was taken at the outset
45 But, to cite an example which may cause further confusion, if the
corporation's tax liability is involved, perhaps it should look to the date
of the declaration of the dividend-as, for example, in determining the
amount of its earned surplus or invested capital for excess profits tax pur-
poses-unless there is a statutory provision which requires a determina-
tion as of a different date. Bulger Block Coal Co. v. United States, 48 F2d
675 (Ct. Cl. 1931); Davidson & Case Lumber Co. v. Motter, 14 F.2d 137 (D.
Kan. 1926); Belmont Iron Works, 9 B.T.A. 216 (1927); Wm. H. Davidow
Sons Co., 1 B.T-A. 1215 (1925). But, if borrowed capital may be included
in equity invested capital, the amount of a dividend duly declared and pay-
able may be so included subject to whatever limitation is prescribed, unless
of course, as in the Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 458, added by 64 STAT. 1137
(1951), the statute is geared to the Mason decision, note 41 supra, in which
event invested capital is not reduced by a dividend declared but not paid.
U. S. Treas. Reg. 130, § 40.458-5 (1950).
46 In addition to the prior definition, the Revenue Act of 1936, § 115(a).
49 STAT. 1687 provided that the term "dividends" should include distribu-
tions made ". . . out of the earnings or profits of the taxable year (computed
as of the close of the taxable year without diminution by reason of any dis-
tributions made during the taxable year), without regard to the amount
of the earnings and profits at the time the distribution was made."
47 The provision as it stands now in the INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 316.
(a) (2), previously was in the Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115 (a) (2), 53 STAT.
46, and in the Revenue Act of 1938, § 115 (a) (2), 52 STAT. 496.
48 This was first stated by regulation in the U.S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art-
115-3 (1936), and has been continued in effect. See U.S. Treas. Reg. 118, §
39.115(a)-2 (1939); and I.T. 3764, 1945 Cxrw. BULL. 188, relating to amor-
tizable bond premium on wholly tax exempt bonds. But the principle was.
applied much earlier. U.S. Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 1541 (1918), pointed out that,
although interest on state bonds and certain other obligations is not tax-
able, dividends paid out of such interest are taxable. See also, I.T. 2131,
IV-1 Cnm. BULL. 90 (1925); I.T. 2222, 111-2 Cumw. BULL. 12 (1924). The theory
is succinctly explained in Charles F. Ayer, 12 B.T.A. 284 (1928).
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that the term "earnings or profits" as used in classifying
corporation distributions is not synonymous with "net
income" as used in the taxing acts. One difference is that
"earnings and profits" includes tax-exempt income" as
well as taxable income.4" Indeed, beginning with the Act
of 1934,0 Treasury Regulations have stated that the term
includes "income not taxable by the Federal Government
under the Constitution,"'" which statement embraces in-
terest on state bonds. Apparently, it also includes items
such as insurance proceeds 2 even if they do not con-
stitute income taxable to the corporation. Thus, there may
be occasions when the ultimate determination of federal
tax liability may depend upon our ability to agree upon
49 But by statutory exception, distributions out of pre-March 1, 1913
earnings or profits are not regarded as dividend income for federal tax pur-
poses. This originated in the Revenue Act of 1916, § 2(a) and 10, 39 STAT.
751 and 765, and now is in the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 316. Beginning with
the Revenue Act of 1921, § 201(b), 42 STAT. 228, it was made clear that this
also is true as to distributions out of an increase in the value of property
accrued before March 1, 1913.
50 U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art. 115-1 (1934). See also U. S. Treas. Reg. 118,
§ 39.115(a)-2 (1953).
51 In view of this attitude, it may seem somewhat strange even under
the tax concept that income which has been earned is not included in earn-
ings and profits prior to the time the corporation makes an accounting of
it for tax purposes; and it is equally interesting that, by virtue of a cor-
poration's tax accounting method, income received but not earned is in-
cluded in earnings or profits before the income is earned or the profit on
the transaction is determined.
52 It was so stated in I.T. 2222, IM1-2 Cum. BULL. 12 (1924). This was
posed as a serious question in Isaac May, 20 B.T.A. 282 (1930), by reason
of the decision in United States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U.S.
189 (1924). But I.T. 2222, supra, appears to be sound, for the rule in it has
been applied even where it was claimed that the corporation acted as agent
and that the insurance was payble to the stockholders as beneficiaries. Cum-
mings v. Commissioner, 73 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1934). Similarly, where a trust
company was an intermediary trustee. Golden v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d
590 (3d Cir. 1940). Query: Does the tax concept of earnings or profits in-
clude items such as accrued but unrealized appreciation, and ripened grain
or mined ore? See Reiling, Tax Accounting and Abnormal Income, cited
in note 33 supra. Also, does it include gifts? Gifts of personal property were
classified as income in the Revenue Act of 1894, § 28, 28 STAT. 553, which
act for other reasons was held unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895). And gifts in excess of $1,000 were
taxed as income under the Virginia Tax Law, § 10 (2) (1924). Also see Win-
sor, The Taxation of Gifts as Income, 9 A.B.A.J. 301 (1923), which was later
reprinted in 6 TAXEs 10 (1923).
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a broad concept of income-income in the ordinary sense,
if not in the economic sense, which is essential to the tax
concept of earnings or profits-in addition to a concept of
income within the purview of the Sixteenth Admendment,
which is involved in defining taxable income. The reason
for this of course is the valid one that tax exempt income
received by a corporation loses its identity upon subse-
quent distribution by the corporation, a corporation and
its stockholders being regarded in law as separate en-
tities.53
Likewise, charges or expenses, though not deductible in
computing taxable net income, ordinarily are taken into
account in computing earnings and profits, ii accordng tj
universal views in the business world they are deductible
for this purpose." But all deductions allowable in arriv-
ing at taxable net income are not allowable in computing
earnings or profits.55
One major item of this character is the excess of per-
centage depletion over cost depletion." Depletion based
upon discovery value is another item in the same cate-
gory, subject to the same limitation, though it is not as
synthetic as percentage depletion. For example, discovery
value, less of course the cost of making the discovery, may
constitute income in the economic sense at the time of the
discovery and, when it is realized in taxable form, may be
attributed to the year of discovery in administering relief
provisions such as those in section 721 of the World War
H excess profits tax.
Then too, even the allowance of cost depletion as it is
applied may not be fully genuine where it is computed
by reference to a "substituted basis" rather than upon
true cost, as, for example, is the case where the property
53 Miller v. Milwaukee, 272 U.S. 713 (1927). Also see notes 31 and 48
supra.
54 Charles F. Ayer, 12 B.T.A. 284 (1928).
55 Loren D. Sales, 35 B.T.A. 938 (1937).
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is received upon a transfer in which gain or loss is not
recognized to the transferor" and where by statute the
transferor's cost or other basis of the property continues
to be the basis for computing such cost depletion as is
allowable to the transferee for tax purposes.
Strictly speaking, the excess of depletion upon a sub-
stituted basis over true cost depletion may not be allowable
in computing earnings or profits except for practical rules
of convenience in income taxation. But this is no cause
for special concern, for the entire matter of deducting de-
pletion in computing earnings or profits available for
dividends would be in the nature of much ado about
nothing if we looked to the facts and geared our tax
concepts to corporation law which applies the wasting
asset doctrine and permits the distribution of dividends
out of depletion reserves of any kind-in which event, we
could proceed more frankly to classify the distributions
56 A rule treating distributions out of a depletion reserve as liquidating
distributions was first adopted in the U. S. Treas. Reg. 33 (Rev.), Art. 4, §
26 (1916), as amended by the act of 1917. The U. S. Treas. Reg. 94, Art. 115-
3 (1936), however, was the first regulation to state the theory that cost de-
pletion is deductible in computing earnings and profits, but it stated that
"discovery and percentage depletion under all Revenue Acts for mines and
oil and gas should not be taken into consideration." To the same effect, U. S.
Treas. Reg. 118, § 39115 (a) -2 (1953). The only statutory provision, which
may be construed as authority for this rule, originated in the Revenue Act
of 1921, § 201 (c), 42 STAT. 228, which provided that distributions not out of
earnings or profits and not out of an increase in value accrued prior to
March 1, 1913, should be applied against the basis of the stock. In the House
Ways and Means Committee report on the Revenue Act of 1924, § 201(d),
43 STAT. 255, this provision was said to include distributions such as those
"out of depreciation or depletion reserves." (Emphasis added). This state-
ment presumes that depletion is deductible in arriving at earnings or profits
for dividend purposes, which is not so in corporation law and business ac-
counting. See citations in note 63 infra. But the Revenue Act of 1924, §
201(d), 43 STAT. 255, and the Revenue Act of 1926, § 201(d), 44 STAT. 11,
and also the Revenue Act of 1928, § 115(d), 45 STAT. 822, specifically pro-
vided for applying distributions from depletion reserves based on discovery
value against the basis of the stock, apparently presuming, as the 1924
committee report shows, that distributions out of a cost depletion reserve
were to be so applied because of the provision as first included in the 1921
Act. Indeed, the committee report stated that the 1921 Act had been so
construed by the Treasury Department. The problem remains the same to-
day. Cf. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301 (c) (2) and 316.
57 See regulations cited in note 56 supra.
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so as to tax or exempt them in any desired manner, with-
out having to encounter all of the difficulties incident to
the term "earnings or profits."
When the tax attitude respecting depletion is separated
out of all the controversy respecting earnings and profits
available for dividends, the result is that distributions out
of a cost depletion reserve are not regarded as dividend
income taxed at ordinary tax rates, but are applied against
the basis of the stockholder's stock and any excess may
be taxed at the capital gain tax rate. On the other hand,
distributions out of percentage or discovery depletion
reserves are taxed at ordinary tax rates to the extent that
they exceed a reserve computed on cost or other tax
basis of the assets." Thus, though a corporation deducts
percentage or discovery depletion in computing taxable
net income, it also must keep account of cost depletion, if
it is to keep its stockholders advised of the tax attitude re-
specting distributions made to them.
In a way it is worthy of particular notice that we have
accepted this result. In the first place, as I have explained,
it may be said that in substance and effect depletion is
not considered to be an allowable deduction in computing
earnings or profits available for dividend distribution. 9
Also, in applying a British income taxing act60 which
58 Logically, the same rule is permitted in computing the cost of goods
sold. By T.D. 6028, 1953-2 Cum. BULL. 100, the U. S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22
(a) -5 (1942), was amended to permit, but not necessarily require, cost de-
pletion to be included in the cost of goods sold. For an explanation of this
change, see the Rev. Rul. 141, 1953-2 CUM. BULL. 101. A similar provision is
contained in the U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 29.22 (a)-5 (1953). This regulation
however in substance affects only the time as of which the depletion is taken
into account for income tax purposes. Where the meaning of cost of goods
sold is a decisive factor other than in fixing the time for accounting for the
deduction, it may be urged that depletion is not includible in the cost of
goods sold. Rev. Rul. 54-88, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 177; and see my discussion
of cost of goods sold in Practical Legal Aspects of Tax Accounting, note 33
supra.
59 This is because the wasting asset doctrine is applied to permit dis-
tributions to stockholders out of depletion reserves. See note 63 infra.
60 Coltness Iron Co. v. Black, 6 App. Cas. 315 (1881), 1 Tax Cas. 287.
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did not enumerate deductions as our statute does and
which treated income as being the net amount after de-
ducting the expenses of earning the income, the courts
took the position that depletion is not allowable in com-
puting taxable income. And in construing the Corpora-
tion Excise Tax Act of 1909 our courts held that no deple-
tion could be deducted in computing gross or net income.6
Thus, except in the case of timber,62 and in the absence
of a statutory provision to the contrary, no depletion is
considered deductible under any theory in arriving at gross
or net income. Indeed, business accounting, which rec-
ognizes that depletion must be provided for before the
net profits are known, also gives effect to the legal theory
that no depletion need be deducted in computing the
amount of dividends which legally may be paid.63 This
however is not to say that all distributions out of deple-
tion reserves should be taxed as ordinary dividend in-
61 Firstly, it was held under the 1909 Act that depletion was not to be'
subtracted from gross sales in computing gross income, Stratton's Inde-
pendence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913); also that moneys received
for ore were not the proceeds of an outright sale of mining property from
which an allocable part of the cost of the property could be subtracted in
arriving at the amount of profit, Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co., 242
U.S. 503 (1917), and United States v. Biwabik lining Co., 247 U.S. 116
(1918). A deduction allowed by the 1909 Act for depreciation did not in-
clude depletion. Goldfield Consol. Mines Co. v. Scott, 247 U.S. 126 (1918).
Similarly, under the 1913 Act, Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103
(1916), and under the 1916 Act, Weiss v. Mohawk lining Co., 264 Fed. 502
(6th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 637 (1920).
62 Under the 1909 Act, Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179 (1918),
and T. D. 1675, (1911), held that the cutting of timber merely changes in
the form of an asset. Similarly, under the Acts of 1913 and 1916, in U. S.
Treas. Reg. 33, Art. 139 (1913), and U. S. Treas. Reg. 33 (Rev.), Art.
173 (1917). Some confusion was introduced by the Revenue Act of 1918, §
214(a) (10), 40 STAT. 1067 (1918), which allowed depletion of timber as a
deduction from gross income (see U.S. Treas. Reg. 45, Art 227 (1918)); but
this does not preclude a subtraction in arriving at gross income. Though
regulations under the Act of 1918 and later acts, recognize that the deple-
tion of timber takes place at the time the timber is cut, they permit a delay
of the depletion-the effect of which is to treat it as a part of the cost of the
timber sold. See, e.g., U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23 (m) -21 (1953).
63 2 FINEnY, Pamciriss OF AccouN'mrn 10 (1928); 2 K.Esr , AccoUNrmG




come, for stockholders of corporations with depletion re-
serves are entitled to be taxed upon the same basis as
stockholders of other corporations, and the wasting asset
doctrine need not be applied for tax purposes to defeat
tax uniformity on a nation-wide basis.6"
Be that as it may, in permitting a deduction for de-
pletion in computing net income, the present scheme con-
forms to business accounting. 5 In allowing stockholders
to apply dividends which are out of a cost depletion re-
serve against the cost or other basis of their stock and
then to be taxed at capital gain rates on any excess dis-
tributions,66 there is a synchronization with the treat-
ment given stockholders of other corporations.6 Thus, the
end result may be a sound one, my only point being that it
is reached in a roundabout way.
The problem, however, is not confined to depletion. It
also concerns depreciation. For example, the present
American rule in corporation law is supposed to be that
provision must be made for depreciation in determining
the amount of net profits available for dividends. But
there is no outstanding list of authorities to this effect.69
However, without questioning this result, it is conceivable
that dividends paid out of earnings as computed without
64 Such rule however may be employed without the tax concept of
earnings and profits, instead of being an added ramification to a structure
which is crowded with complexities.
65 See note 63 supra.
66 As to the statutory basis for this, see note 56 supra.
67 There are other instances where the amounts received by a stock-
holder are applied against the cost or basis of his stock rather than against
the amount of capital paid in for the stock, and for this reason the amount so
applied is not necessarily a distribution out of capital receipts.
68 And it also may concern losses sustained on the sale or other dispo-
sition of capital assets. See articles cited in note 69 infra. Shrinkage in the
market value of securities does not reduce earnings or profits, though an
unreasonable accumulation thereof may subject the corporation to a special
tax on its accumulated taxable income. Helvering v. Natl Grocery Co., 304
U.S. 282 (1938); R. L. Blaffer & Co. v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 487 (5th Cir.
1939); Nipoch Corp., 36 B.TNA. 662 (1937); Reynard Corp., 37 B.T.A. 552
(1938). Contra, C. H. Spitzner & Sons, Inc., 37 B.TA. 511 (1938).
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deducting depreciation may be lawful, if, for example,
it is clearly shown that the property has appreciated in
value and that the appreciation more than offsets the de-
preciation.
The validity of this argument does not depend upon
treating unrealized appreciation as taxable income. It
may be sufficient to say that the value added by the ap-
preciation constitutes income at the time it accrues, though
it is not returnable as taxable income until it is realized
by sale or exchange. Or, it may be that the appreciation
assures assets sufficient to prevent an impairment of the
capital.7 But whatever the problem as to appreciation
may be, any search for the solution only serves to em-
phasize the simplicity of the pattern employed in the 1913
Act.
The Act of 1913 also did not pose any special problem
respecting the treatment of gains and losses of the type
which for some time have not been recognized for income
tax purposes. One reason for this is that the 1913 Act did
not contain such non-recognition provisions. But even if it
had, most likely such gains or losses would not have been
ignored in computing earnings and profits available for
dividends.7' A gain, which is not recognized for tax pur-
poses, nonetheless is a gain; otherwise it would not be a
69 But what recent precedent there is is rather positive. "Directors
would be derelict in their duty if they did not ... provide for depreciation,"
Nat'l Newark & Essex Banking Co. v. Durant Motor Co., 124 N.J. Eq. 213, 1
A.2d 216, 219 (1938). See the Note, The Effect of Depreciation, Depletion
and Appreciation of Assets on the Payment of Dividends, 28 CoLva. L.
REv. 231 (1928); and Weiner, Theory of Anglo-American Dividend Law: The
English Cases, 28 CoLunm. L. REv. 1046 (1928), and his next article of the
series dealing with the Theory of Anglo-American Dividend Law: Ameri-
can Statutes and Cases, 29 CoLum. L. REv. 461 (1929). As to the statutory
basis for tax purposes see note 56 supra.
70 In administering the World War II excess profits tax relief provisions
in respect of abnormal income, appreciation was recognized as a possible
basis for attributing income to the years in which appreciation occurred.
See Reiling, Tax Accounting and Abnormal Income, cited in note 33 supra.
And, as I have shown above, even under the tax concept, earnings or profits




"non-recognized gain." By the same token, a loss not
recognized for tax purposes is a loss. And the gain in-
creases the earnings and profits available for dividends,
while the loss decreases them.
The reason for the present tax rule of not taking a
non-recognized gain or loss into account in computing earn-
ings and profits available for dividend distribution appears
to be largely a matter of convenience to save determining
the amount of the non-recognized gain or loss; or perhaps
there may be some fear that, if a non-recognized gain or
loss is taken into account, an adjustment also might be
necessary for the recognized gain or loss upon a subse-
quent sale or exchange of the property, thus causing a
duplicate adjustment.72 The problem therefore is to choose
the gain (or the loss) transaction which should affect
earnings or profits, i.e., the one which results in no rec-
ognized gain or loss for tax purposes, or the one which
does. By statute, the latter is taken into account. The
fact that a statutory provision is deemed necessary to se-
cure this result therefore dramatizes the observation that,
once we initiate a distinct tax rule to ignore a universally
accepted reality, such action may require a further rule
71 It was not until the promulgation of the U. S. Treas. Reg. 86, Art.
115-1 (1934), that the regulations provided for no adjustment to earnings
and profits respecting those gains and losses, although this had been the
practice, which however was disapproved in Commissioner v. F. J. Young
Corp., 103 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1939), (thus again emphasizing the difficulties
encountered when distinct tax rules stray too far away from common con-
cepts). But the rule in the regulations was made statutory by the Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, § 115 (1), as added by the Second Int. Rev. Code of 1940, §
501(a), 54 STAT. 1004 (1940). Similarly in the INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 312
(f) (1).
72 As an illustration of the difficulty which we have in this respect, some
have said that the statutory rule in the Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115 (1),
added by 54 STAT. 1004 (1940), (similar to the INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 312
(f) (1) ) for not reducing earnings and profits by a loss disallowed on a
wash sale of securities is to prevent an improper duplicate reduction of
earnings and profits on account of the loss, thus showing how easy it is for
us to believe that the law of income taxation has so lost its bearings that it
would sanction a duplicate reduction in the absence of a legislative man-
date to the contrary. Cf. 1 MoNTGomERY, FEDERAL TAxEs-CopoRATioNs AND
PARTNERSHn'S 158 (1951).
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extending the abstraction to other circumstances in order
to prevent us from reaching improper tax results.
So much for the tax concept of the general elements
of earnings or profits available for dividend distribution.
The next step is to ascertain the manner in which earnings
and profits as computed pursuant to this concept are
affected by corporate distributions, and first of all by
distributions of stock dividends.
The Act of 1913 did not pose the questions which arise
in this connection, because stock dividends were at that
time believed to constitute taxable income. Indeed, in the
1916 and 1918 acts,7 Congress expressly made it clear
that the legislative intent was to tax stock dividends. In
1918 the Supreme Court however held74 that where a
corporation declares a dividend on its common stock,
in the form of common stock, the stock dividend was not
taxable under the 1913 Act. And in 1920 it held75 that
the 1916 Act was unconstitutional in so far as it purported
to tax a common stockholder because of his having re-
ceived a dividend in common stock. Following this de-
cision, Congress provided in the Act of 192176 that no
stock dividend should be subject to tax, and a similar
provision was included in all subsequent revenue acts
prior to the Act of 1936.
By the time the 1936 Act was passed, the Supreme Court
had made it clear that all stock dividends are not con-
stitutionally tax-free. 7 The statute therefore was changed
to tax stock dividends and stock rights in cases where they
constitute income within the meaning of the Sixteenth
73 Revenue Act of 1918, § 201(c), 40 STAT. 1059 (1919); Revenue Act of
1916, § 2 (a), 10, 39 STAT. 757, 765.
74 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918).
75 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
76 Revenue Act of 1921, § 201(d), 42 STAT. 228.
77 The case bef6re it involved the basis of common stock issued to hold-
ers of non-voting preferred stock, and the common stock was said to con-
stitute income to its recipient, which could have been taxed had the taxing
act not provided otherwise. Kosbiand v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936).
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Amendment,7 thus further reopening the controversy
respecting the taxability of stock dividends.7 9
Shortly after the enactment of the 1936 Act, but not
because of it, the Supreme Court pointed out that for a
stock dividend to constitute income it must work a change
so that the proportional interest of the stockholder after
the stock dividend is essentially different from his prior
interest," to the end that the stockholder may be said
to have received property on the distribution. And this
holding in turn posed questions as to what constitutes
a change of this character.8 ' In the 1954 Code 2 the applica-
tion of this distinction however is precluded because it
exempts all stock dividends except where they are made
in discharge of preference dividends or where the stock-
78 Revenue Act of 1936, § 115 (f) (1), 49 STAT. 1688.
79 But this change did not suffice to permit a reopening of the question
whether common on common may be taxed. Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S.
371 (1943). For an idea of the scope of this controversy, see Dean, The Stock
Dividend, 32 TAXEs 586 (1954).
80 Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604 (1943).
81 The difficulties are illustrated by these examples: Preferred stock
dividend on common was held not taxable where only common stock was
outstanding. Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1953),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 918 (1954); Bass v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 300 (1st
Cir. 1942). Contrary views had been taken previously. Francis Elliott
Clark, 28 B.T.A. 1225 (1933); Pearl B. Brown, 26 B.T.A. 901 (1932). It was
held that there was a change of the stockholders proportionate interest in
the corporation where preferred stock was outstanding at a time a preferred
stock dividend was paid on the common. Helvering v. Pfeiffer, 302 U.S. 247
(1937); Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238 (1937). The lower courts had
taken a contrary view. Commissioner v. Tillotson Mfg. Co., 76 F.2d 189
(6th Cir. 1935); James H. Torrens, 31 B.T.A. 787 (1934). No income was
held to have been received where a stock dividend of non-voting common
was issued to the holders of voting and non-voting common. Helvering v.
Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604 (1943). Similarly, in the case of a common stock div-
idend issued to holders of cumulative non-voting preferred, Koshland v.
Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936), and where common stockholders received
class B preferred which was junior to other preferred outstanding, Albert
E. Smith, 39 B.T.A. 80 (1939). But where class A stockholders received a
stock dividend in the same stock and class B stock was issued to class B
stockholders, the stock dividends were held tax-free to all stockholders.
Wiegand v. Commissioner, 194 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1952); Tourtelot v. Com-
missioner, 189 F.2d 167 (7th Cir. 1951).
82 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 305. But, if the dividend stock is not com-
mon on common, the profit on its disposition or redemption may be treated
as ordinary income. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 306.
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holder may elect to take cash or other property'3 in lieu
of the stock dividend.
These changes and their ramifications alone are suf-
ficient to add considerable complexity to the task of ad-
justing earnings or profits on account of stock dividends.
In addition, there are two further complications. In the
first place, we began as early as the regulations"4 under
the 1916 Act to enunciate the idea that stock dividends
clearly exempt from tax under that Act (i.e., those de-
clared from pre-March 1, 1913 earnings or from surplus
created by a revaluation of capital assets) do not repre-
sent a "distribution" of earnings or profits subject to tax
in the hands of the corporation. This is so. The implication
however is that taxable stock dividends constitute dis-
tributions of earnings or profits, which of course is not
a fact.
No distribution of earnings or profits is made to stock-
holders by the issuance of a stock dividend. A stock divi-
dend may capitalize earnings and profits and prevent them
from being available for distribution to stockholders.8 5 To
assume for tax purposes that the earnings and profits
so capitalized will be distributed as dividends even though
such action violates corporation law, is not too realistic
except perhaps in the case of a closely held corporation
with stockholders who for reasons"6 peculiar to the case
may not observe corporation law too rigidly.
On the other hand, a stock dividend, which is taxable,
represents income to the stockholder because it consti-
tutes property received by the stockholder in that he re-
83 This first exception, which covers the case where stock is issued in
payment of a money liability, appears to accord with previously existing
law, and the second exception incorporates the rule previously stated in the
Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115(f) (2), 53 STAT. 47; in United States v. Davison,
9 F.2d 1022 (3d Cir. 1926) (memorandum decision), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 670
(1926); and in United States v. Mellon, 281 Fed. 645 (3d Cir. 1922).
81 U. S. Treas. Reg. 33 (Rev.), Art. 4, para. 28 (1916-17).
85 See Gibbons v. Mahon, note 17 supra.
86 See note 16 supra.
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ceives an interest different from that which his former
stock holdings represent.8 7 In such case, whether the
corporation has earnings or profits is immaterial, for the
stock dividend may be income, even though it does not
"distribute" earnings or profits."8 In other words, the
earnings or profits test has no bearing on the question
whether a stock dividend constitutes income.
Nevertheless, the capitalization of earnings and profits
by the issuance of a stock dividend does, as a matter of
corporation law, reduce the earnings and profits available
for distribution to stockholders. This is so, whether the
dividend does or does not constitute income to the stock-
holder. But, because we apply the earnings or profits test
for tax purposes, we are forced to ignore this important
fact and unrealistically say that the earnings or profits
available for dividends are not reduced by a non-taxable
stock dividend. 9
Now what I have said suffices to show that the tax
concept of earnings or profits-and in turn the tax con-
cept of dividend income-has long been an artificial one.
Two further observations however are implicit, which may
be considerably significant if perchance there is some
thought that this concept is bottomed upon reality. In the
first place, it is evident that, where a distinct tax concept
of any kind runs counter to fact, there always is a possi-
bility that it may be pierced by an abrupt reversion to
actuality, unless the concept is clearly buttressed by
statute to preclude any such possibility.
87 See cases cited in notes 80 and 81 supra.
88 But by corporation law it may be that the stock dividend must capi-
talize earnings or profits in order to be a valid stock dividend unless surplus
created by a revaluation of capital assets may be capitalized by a stock divi-
dend. See Note, The Effect of Depreciation, Depletion and Appreciation of
Assets on the Payment of Dividends, 28 COLum. L. REv. 231 (1928).
89 This rule was stated in the Revenue Act of 1936, § 115 (h), 49 STAT.
1688, and was continued in the Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 115 (h), 53 STAT. 48,
and in the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 312 (d). As so stated, it includes other
stock or securities which are received tax-free.
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To cite a recent experience, a reversion of this sort
occurred in the Hirshon and Godley casesY° In each case,
the corporation made a distribution in kind of property
which had appreciated in value, the distribution being
made at a time when the corporate earnings or profits
were not sufficient to cover the appreciation in property.
Because of statutory provisions purporting to limit divi-
dend income to distributions out of earnings or profits,
the court, in order to classify the appreciated value as divi-
dend income, treated the excess of fair market value over
the corporation's basis of the asset as a distribution of
earnings or profits. This was done on the ground that the
cost (or other basis) of the property was out of earnings or
profits and hence the entire property was out of earnings
or profits.
This, so it has been argued, goes against the tax rule
that unrealized appreciation is not income to the corpora-
tion, and allegedly it is contrary to a long established tax
practice 1 of not including appreciation in corporate earn-
ings or profits. But to make my point, the distribution was
not in any respect out of capital receipts. And, despite an
artificially devised statute which may be construed to give
a different treatment, the common concept of dividends
prevailed by force of conviction, though it had to do so
by reason of skillful statutory construction.92
The next general observation respecting the artificiality
is in the nature of a reminder that, as long as the tax
concept of earnings and profits is employed, further arti-
90 Commissioner v. Godley, 213 F.2d 529 (3d Cir. 1954); Commissioner v.
Hirshon, 213 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1954). For a discussion of these cases, see
Mintz & Plumb, Dividends in Kind-The Thunderbolts and the New Look,
10 TAX L. Rv. 41, 405 (1954, 1955).
91 The statutory point at issue had its origin in the Revenue Act of 1921,
§ 201(c), 42 STAT. 228, in effect providing that distributions out of earnings
or profits, and not out of an increase in value of property accrued prior to
March 1, 1913, were to be applied against the basis of the stock. In explain-
ing the Revenue Act of 1924, § 201(d), 43 STAT. 255, the Senate Finance




ficiality may be validly devised to revert in a circuitous and
perhaps complicated manner to the ordinary concept of
dividend income. A statutory change of this character
occurred when a definition of dividends was expanded in
1936 to include a distribution "out of" earnings or profits
of the taxable year of the distribution." This definition
does not prevent a tax adjustment where any such dis-
tribution was returned to the corporation because of its
illegality. On the other hand, it does not extend to amounts
which are not out of capital receipts and are distributed
in liquidation of a corporation, or to similar amounts
distributed in cancellation or redemption of stock in cases
where the cancellation or redemption is not essentially
equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend. In
other words, in this respect, it leaned far toward the com-
mon concept of dividends but did not go as far as that con-
cept would require.
Another illustration of the artifice which may be used
in reverting to the common meaning of dividends is to be
found in the Revenue Code of 1954,"4 which, oddly
enough, pertains to appreciation. This is the method
adopted. When certain described assets95 which have
appreciated in value are distributed in kind to the cor-
92 It is implicit in this discussion that I do not attribute the nature of
the decisions in the Godley and Hirshon cases, note 90 supra, to a "common
law" rule of construing federal taxing statutes to protect the revenues. For
this theory in the light of other cases, see Erickson, The Common Law of
Federal Taxation, 7 U. FLA. L. REv. 178 (1954). As to the attitude in the 1954
Code respecting these cases, see the INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 301 (c) (2), 316;
the JoiNT CoMM. oN IwT. REV. TAXATION, U. S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, SUMMARY
OF THE NEW PROVIsIONs OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954 36 (1955); the
S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. 28 (1954). See also Peterson, Corporate
Distributions and Adjustments-Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, I. Corporate Distributions, 30 NOTRE DAME LAW. 191 (1955), and the
articles in note 90 supra, 10 TAX LAW. REV. 41, 405 (1954, 1955).
93 Revenue Act of 1936, § 115(a), 49 STAT. 1687 (1936). Similarly, the
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 316 (a) (2).
94 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 312 (b).
95 Stock in trade of the corporation or other property of a kind which
would properly be included in inventory; and property held by the corpo-
ration primarily for sale to its customers.
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porate stockholders, earnings and profits are at that time
increased by the amount of the excess of the fair market
value of the assets over the adjusted basis of the assets to
the corporation, subject however to an adjustment for
certain liabilities; and earnings or profits are of course
then correspondingly reduced because of the distribution.
Thus, at the single instant the distribution occurs, ap-
preciation is in and out of earnings and profits in a wink
of the eye.
In such case, if we avail ourselves of blinders and look
only to what a pure concept of earnings or profits should
be, it may be, as the critics of this provision say, that it
poses the question whether unrealized appreciation is
truly an element of corporate earnings or profits. On
the other hand, even if appreciation is not a proper part
of earnings or profits, the proper rationale of the provision
clearly seems to be that it in substance and effect partially
abandons the earnings or profits test, and to that extent
it reverts to the ordinary concept of dividend income."6
This, I may add, is no new development. In the treat-
ment of liquidating distributions by collapsible corpora-
tions as first prescribed by the Act of 1950, the same re-
sult may be achieved, the only difference being in the form
of device used to secure the result. In such case, the statute
frankly prohibits the gain, attributable inter alia to ap-
preciation, from being considered to be capital gain taxable
at the special capital gain tax rates. 7
This is the rational foundation for other in-and-out
adjustments required by the 1954 Code, which however
also may be explained on other interesting grounds. One
such adjustment" relates to rights to payment for goods
96 In the Summary, note 92 supra, on referring to this adjustment of
earnings and profits, it is stated at page 36: "The adjustment serves to insure
that appreciated inventory assets have dividend consequences when distrib-
uted to stockholders."
97 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 341, which in this respect continues the rule
adopted in the Int. Rev. Code of 1937, § 117 (m), added by 64 STAT. 934 (1950).
98 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 312 (b).
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delivered or to be delivered and for services rendered or
to be rendered, where the rights are distributed in kind to
the stockholders, the amount of such rights not having been
included in corporate taxable income by reason of the
method of tax accounting employed by the corporation.
Similar in-an-out adjustments to the earnings and profits
account are required where a LIFO inventory is dis-
tributed in kind.9 In such case, the adjustment is in the
amount by which the inventory when valued other than
on a LIFO basis exceeds the value on that basis.
Clearly, these adjustments may be supported on the
theory that the statute in reality abandons the earnings
and profits test of dividend income with respect to the
distributions reflected in the adjustments. But an addi-
tional theory may be that the adjustments are but delayed
corrections of the earnings and profits account to include
earnings which, except for the method of tax accounting
employed by the corporation and even if not income in
the constitutional sense, would have been included in the
account at an earlier date. As a matter of fact, in the ad-
justments respecting LIFO inventories, the theory goes
further, in that the amount of the adjustment is included
in the corporation's taxable income by reason of the
distribution.'0 °
The strength of this theory is illustrated by the fact that
gain also is taxed, and in-and-out adjustments to earnings
and profits are provided for, where a corporation dis-
tributes property subject to a liability in excess of the
adjusted basis of the property in the hands of the distribut-
ing corporation or where the distributee of the property
99 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 311(b).
100 The principle is much the same as that where a corporation reporting
for tax purposes on a completed contract basis was liquidated before the
contract was completed and the corporation was held to be taxable upon the
income earned prior to the liquidation. Standard Paving Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 190 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1951); Jud Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 153 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1946).
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assumes a liability in excess of such basis.' But, if the
theory were not sound, the fact remains that the stock-
holder's tax liability does not depend upon an earnings
or profits test where as in these cases, and also in the
distribution of proceeds of a loan insured by the Govern-
ment,1 '2 the distribution is not out of capital paid in for
the stock and the stockholder receives an increment or
gain from his stock interest in the corporation.
For the same reason - if I may refer to a problem of
much wider significance - except for the statutory tax
rule making dividend income dependent upon earnings
and profits, there may have been no occasion for the alarm
and litigation °3 which led to the adoption of the fiction
that, where a corporate reorganization results in no rec-
ognizable gain or loss, the earnings and profits of the
original corporation become the earnings or profits of the
continuing corporation. In such case, it also may be said
that the capital paid in for stock does not increase by
reason of the reorganization, and the continuing corpora-
tion is in a position to make distributions which are not
out of capital receipts, which distributions, when received
by the stockholder, constitute dividend income in the
ordinary sense.
By reason of the long sustained effort to bend the scheme
of tracing the source of distributions to fit all situations,
the issuance of stock dividends became a further source
of difficulty where it was said that cancellation or redemp-
tion of stock might be used to defeat the purposes of the
tax. Indeed, this difficulty was anticipated when the Act
of 1921 was changed to make it clear that no stock
101 IwT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 311 (c).
102 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 312(j).
103 Baker v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1936), followed in Cable
v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1939), and Corrigan v. Commissioner,
103 F.2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1939) (memorandum decision); Murchison's Estate v.
Commissioner, 76 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1935); United States v. Kauffman, 62




dividends were to be taxed. It was then provided that, if
after the distribution of a stock dividend the corporation
proceeds to cancel or redeem its stock at such time and
in such manner as to make the distribution and cancella-
tion or redemption "essentially equivalent to the distribu-
tion of a taxable dividend," the amount received in re-
demption or cancellation was to be treated as a taxable
dividend to the extent of the post-March 1, 1913 earnings
or profits.'04
This problem however was not settled by provisions
such as those in the 1921 Act. The statute has been
amended from time to time in an effort to prevent alleged
abuses. There has been considerable litigation to determine
what is "essentially equivalent to the distribution of a
taxable dividend."' 5 And the problem, though elaborately
treated in the Code of 1954,106 still is with us.
In these cases, it seems to me that the earnings or profits
test adds a complication, especially where the redemption
of stock is a disproportionate one.07 in that the dividend
stock in the hands of other holders is not redeemed. In
104 See the Revenue Act of 1921, § 201(d), 42 STAT. 228. Similarly, in the
Revenue Act of 1924, § 201(f), 43 STAT. 255. The Revenue Act of 1926, §
201(g), 44 STAT. 11, however, extended the rule to cover any stock can-
celled or redeemed, "whether or not such stock was issued as a stock divi-
dend." This provision was continued in the later acts until the enactment of
the INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 302, which applies the rule but did not adopt
the language previously employed.
105 For an elaboration of the difficulty on this point, see Treusch, Corpo-
rate Distributions and Adjustments: Recent Case Reminders Of Some Old
Problems under the New Code, 32 TAXEs 1023, 1035 (1954) (a paper deliv-
ered at the Seventh Annual Federal Tax Conference of the University of
Chicago).
106 The Irr. Rnv. CODE OF 1954, § 302, which is in many respects substan-
tially the same as the prior statute but adds three other tests which had no
statutory equivalent in the prior statute, namely: (1) whether the distribu-
tion in redemption is substantially disproportionate with respect to the
stockholder; (2) whether it is in complete redemption of all of the corpo-
rate stock owned by him; or (3) whether the redemption is of stock issued
by a railroad corporation pursuant to a plan of reorganization under section
77 of the Bankruptcy Act. See also INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 306, pursuant to
which the profit on a redemption of dividend stock other than common on
common may be taxed as ordinary income.
107 See the INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 302, which makes a distinction based
on whether or not the distribution is a disproportionate one.
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corporation law, and in income taxation, it is recognized
that dividends may be distributed disproportionately if
the stockholders agree;'08 and, unless there is a dissenting
stockholder who has taken action compelling a pro rata
distribution, it would seem that the disproportionate dis-
tribution may for tax purposes be recognized as a valid
distribution, and that the same rule may be applied to
redemptions. Admittedly, however, the fact that a redemp-
tion is disproportionately made may increase the difficulty
of showing that the redemption was equivalent to the
distribution of a dividend, if a determination to this effect
is in any way believed to turn on whether the redemption
was part of a device to avoid tax.
Be that as it may, the compelling motive for juggling
corporate distributions, redemptions and liquidations for
tax avoidance purposes springs from the general pattern,
first adopted in the 1918 Act,"° of treating distributions
received by stockholders in cancellation, redemption or
liquidation of stock as belonging in the same class with
payments received upon a sale or exchange of stock."0
The effect of this is to pose the perplexing question whether
all gain from liquidating distributions or from redemptions
of stock should be treated as dividend income, as was
possible under the 1913 Act and, to the extent of post-
March 1, 1913 earnings and profits, also was possible
under the 1921 Act;1" or whether the distribution in
redemption of the dividend stock is to be applied against
108 See especially 58th Street Plaza Theatre, Inc., 16 T.C. 469 (1951), and
the cases cited therein. As to corporation law, see Breslin v. Fres-Breslin
Co., 70 N.J.L. 274, 58 Atl. 313 (1904); Pittsburgh & Steubenville R. R. v.
Allegheny County, 79 Pa. 210 (1875). But there may be a factual question
whether withdrawals by one stockholder or by the majority stockholders
constitute dividends or loans. Cf. Rollen C. Reynolds, 44 B.T.A. 343 (1941).
But whether the withdrawals are disproportionate is not determinative of
whether they are loans or dividends. Ben R. Meyer, 45 B.T.A. 228 (1941).
109 Revenue Act of 1918, § 201 (c), 40 STAT. 1059.
110 A stockholder who receives any such distribution certainly is not a
seller of stock. He does not have the duties and rights which depend upon
a seller's engagements.
III U. S. Treas. Reg. 62, Art. 1545 (1921).
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the holder's basis in the stock and if it exceeds such basis
the excess may be taxed at capital gain rates;" 2 or whether
the possibility of capital gain should be limited to the
excess of capital receipts returned by the corporation to
stockholders over the stockholders' basis of their stock.
Lastly, if simplicity is an important objective, it is
significant that by reason of the earnings and profits test,
a stockholder can not compute his tax liability by refer-
ence solely to the amounts which he receives as distribu-
tions on his stock. In addition, he must know what the
earnings and profits of the corporation are as determined
for tax purposes. Thus, though there is no statutory
mandate that a corporation shall furnish its stockholders
all of the information essential to a correct tax report
of distributions received, the corporation may have an
obligation of some kind to furnish this information to its
stockholders. This involves considerable labor, time and
expense to the corporation, and there is the additional
burden on the Internal Revenue Service in auditing the
corporation's earnings and profits. Where there is a change
in views as to the proper meaning of the term "earnings or
profits," this change carries back to every similar item in
the history of the corporation. Obviously, the work of keep-
ing such statement up to date is not entirely a simple
matter.
Now, in all I have said, I trust it is implicit that un-
satisfactory complexities respecting the taxation of cor-
porate distributions are not inherent in income taxation.
They are not all bottomed upon universal concepts of
reason and justice. They are man-contrived and man-
operated. And they are not of recent origin.
I must say however that it may be hard for a tax tech-
nician to discard the tangled webs of complexity which we
112 Where the dividend stock does not constitute income which may be
taxed, the holding period essential to such treatment for the dividend stock
relates back to the date of acquisition of the stock on which the dividend
stock was received.
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have woven during the past forty years. And it may be
equally difficult for him to understand that the law of
income taxation has the power to develop a simpler system
without the benefit of detailed legislation. For some time,
we have had a growing psychosis that rules of reason in
taxing income may be developed and brought into opera-
tion only by legislation; and we tend to lose sight of the
source and power of a law of income taxation. We begin
with a complicated pattern, which can not be brought into
operation except by legislation, and, in instances where it
results shock our tax conscience, we resort to a simpler
philosophy as a corrective means, at a time when it may
be put into effect only by complex devices which tend to
obscure any intended simplicity.
Perhaps it would be better if the basic scheme of taxing
corporate distributions were a simple one with variations
wherever deemed necessary, instead of formally subjecting
all distributions to a complex tax rule and then attempting
to superimpose simplicity upon such structure in an effort
to remove undue hardship or to prevent tax avoidance.
Be that as it may, simplicity may be possible, even if
according to the skeptic it is not probable.
The purpose of this discussion however is not to furnish
a blueprint of the actions which may be taken. My main
desire is that an effort of some kind may be made to destroy
the illusion that complexity is inescapable - indeed, if
we may believe our ears, that further complexity is in-
evitable. And I would like to pin-point our own thinking
as the source of our -difficulties, whether they are real or
imaginary, to the end that, if we must have a high degree
of complexity, we may at least agree upon the reason for
its existence.
Herman T. Reiling*
* Assistant Chief Counsel, Internal Revenue Service.
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